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migration and transition theory: a 
labor market perspective 
or more than twenty years demographers have been announcing 
to the world, although with little impact on politicians and public 
opinion, that an unprecedented demographic implosion was going 
Abstract
The paper proposes a new logical system 
to build demographic scenarios based on 
a model that explain migration inﬂ  ows 
as a function of the manpower needs that 
countries with below replacement fertility are 
experiencing, as a result both of the decline 
in Working Age Population and employment 
growth.  Using this approach we show that 
the WAP of countries characterized by low 
fertility will necessarily increase; that the 
migration balance of numerous countries will 
turn from negative to positive well before 
2050; that the level of the international 
migration ﬂ  ows will progressively increase to 
unprecedented values so that at least 250-300 
million people will move from developing 
countries to developed countries in the next 
50 years; that the decline in fertility and 
the relative rates of employment growth of 
developed and developing countries will 
determine radical changes in the pattern of 
international migrations. The last part of the 
paper discusses some policy implications of 
this vision of the future. 
Key words: demographic forecasts, labour 
market, international migration, structural 
burden, transition theory. 
Resumen
Predicciones demográﬁ  cas, migración y 
teoría de transición: una perspectiva del 
mercado de trabajo  
El trabajo propone un nuevo sistema lógico 
para construir escenarios demográﬁ  cos 
basados en un modelo que explique los ﬂ  ujos 
entrantes de migración como una función de 
las necesidades de mano de obra que países 
con tasas de fecundidad por debajo de los 
niveles de remplazo están experimentando 
como resultado del declive de la población 
en edad laboral y el crecimiento del empleo. 
Usando este enfoque mostramos que la 
población en edad laboral (PEL) de los 
países caracterizados por un bajo nivel de 
fecundidad necesariamente crecerá; que el 
balance migratorio de numerosos países 
cambiará de negativo a positivo bastante 
antes de 2050; que el nivel de los ﬂ  ujos 
migratorios internaciones progresivamente 
incrementará hasta valores no vistos de 
manera que entre 250 y 300 millones de 
personas migrarán de países en desarrollo 
hacia desarrollados en los siguientes 50 años; 
que el declive en fecundidad y el crecimiento 
relativo de las tasas de empleo de países 
desarrollados y en desarrollo determinará 
cambios radicales en el patrón de las 
migraciones internacionales. 
Palabras clave: predicciones demográﬁ  cas, 
mercado de trabajo, migración internacional, 
carga estructural, teoría de la transición.Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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to strike the more developed countries. The cause? In total opposition 
to all previous forecasts, the decline in fertility, that had began with the 
industrial revolution, has not stopped at the replacement level of around 
2.1 children per woman, but has dropped below this threshold in numerous 
developed and developing countries. It has been unanimously maintained 
that this will determine a relevant reduction of total population, an even 
more  pronounced  contraction  of  Working Age  Population  (WAP)  and 
progressive ageing phenomena that will seriously threaten the existing 
welfare systems. 
In the last 50 years the forecasting performance of demographers has 
not been very successful. The historical change of the sign of the migration 
balance of the countries of the North shore of the Mediterranean came as 
a big surprise not only to the citizen and politicians of Spain, Portugal, 
Italy and Greece,1 but also to demographers and economists. According 
to the theory of demographic transition,2 the extraordinary demographic 
revolution that has been affecting an increasing number of countries starting 
at the end of the XVIII century was expected to provoke the passage from a 
traditional demographic regime, characterized by high rates of fertility and 
mortality, to a modern demographic regime characterized by low rates of 
fertility and mortality. Both regimes are described as equilibrium regimes. 
Therefore, the theory of demographic transition has always maintained 
that the decline of the rate of fertility would have stopped at the value of 
2.1 children per woman. This prediction has already been largely falsiﬁ  ed 
by empirical evidence, but continues to represent a reference point for 
theoretical  and  empirical  analysis.  Finally,  in  the  last  twenty  years, 
demographic forecasts have largely underestimated the migration balances 
of the countries with below replacement fertility and, therefore, their level 
of working age population and total population. 
The paper maintains that also the forecast of a demographic implosion 
will be disproved and that the countries affected by below replacement 
fertility will witness a growth of working age and total population. This 
result  that  contradicts  all  the  available  forecasts  is  generated  by  the 
adoption of different assumptions on the migration balance. In the standard 
model future migration balances are assumed equal to the average value 
of the migration balances registered in the previous ten years and constant 
1 The sign of the migration balance became negative in Italy in 1972, in Portugal in 1974, in 
Spain and in Greece in 1975.
2 Together with the Malthusian theory, the theory of demographic transition is, according to 
Chesnais, the only theoretical body of demography, “a science in which general theories are 
rare”; (Chesnais, 1986: 3). octubre/diciembre 2009
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over the period of the forecast.3 No consideration is given to the future 
trends of WAP and to the relationship between the demographic sphere and 
the economic sphere and, more speciﬁ  cally, to the relationship between 
immigration and the demand for labour. A different logical system based 
on  an  immigration  model  that  posit  a  functional  relationship  between 
immigration  and  the  decline  in  WAP  and  employment  growth,  shows 
that in countries with a TFR below two immigration is normally above 
replacement level and does therefore generate an increase in WAP and 
Total Population. The same approach will then bring to the conclusion that 
numerous European countries in transition from a command economy to 
a market-based economy will become countries of arrival so that, in not 
too far a future, all European countries will register positive migration 
balances. This will be true also for other countries like Korea and Cuba. 
The paper does also analyze the problem of the structural burden. The 
use of an economic indicator brings to the conclusion that the process of 
ageing, induced by the decline in fertility, will not necessarily bring to 
a worsening of the structural burden. The increase in the number of the 
dependant can, in fact, be offset by an increase in the employment level 
and in the rate of employment. The ﬁ  nal part of the paper is devoted to 
a short discussion of some policy implications of this new vision of the 
demographic future for what relates to the lack of labour supply, to the 
structural  burden,  to  the  demographic  unbalance  that  characterizes  an 
increasing  number  of  developed  and  developing  countries.  Some  ﬁ  nal 
notations are directed to explicit the relationship between migration ﬂ  ows 
and the theory of demographic transition. 
The area of potential demographic decline 
The  fertility  rates  of  the  more  than  200  countries  in  which  the  world 
population  is  today  divided  present  two  main  characteristics:  an 
unprecedented dispersion of values and a very high number of countries 
with total fertility below-replacement level. 
3 After  having  acknowledged  that  “International  migration  is  the  component  of  population 
change most difﬁ  cult to measure and estimate reliably” and that “the movement of people 
across boundaries is subject to a great deal of volatility” the last World Population Prospects 
conclude that “projections of future international migration levels are the least robust part of 
current population projections and reﬂ  ect mainly a continuation of recent levels and trends in net 
migration”; (Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009: 40). Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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According to the last survey published by the Population Division,4 total 
fertility rates are included between a maximum of 7.3 children per woman 
in the People’s Republic of Congo and a minimum of 0.8 in Macao. Of the 
195 countries and territories considered by the Survey 67 have a fertility 
rate at or below 2.1,5 45 between 2.11 and three, and 83 above 3 (ﬁ  g. 1).
In the ﬁ  rst group of countries total population is already declining, or 
will start to decline in the next few years. The fertility rates of the countries 
in the second group can be expected to decline below two in the next 20-
30 years and their total population to decrease in the second half of the 
century. The third group includes the countries in which the demographic 
explosion will almost certainly continue for a long time, possibly beyond 
the end of the century. For the moment, let’s deﬁ  ne these three areas as 
the Area of the Potential Demographic Decline (APDD),6 the Area of 
the Future Potential Demographic Decline (AFPDD) and the Area of the 
Demographic Explosion (ADE). 
In the medium variant scenario7 of the Population Division total fertility 
is assumed “to converge eventually toward a level of 1.85 children per 
woman”.8  Therefore,  according  to  the  most  probable  scenario  of  the 
Population Division, an increasing number of countries is expected to 
register declines in total and working age population together with relevant 
ageing phenomena. Will this forecast become true?
The projection of a closed population can be considered rather reliable 
over the medium run since, under normal conditions, fertility and mortality 
rates  do  not  present  dramatic  changes  and,  therefore,  past  tendencies 
provide good indications for the future.9 Moreover, no viable alternative 
methodology is today available. 
4 Population Division, 2007; the survey covers 195 countries and territories with more than 100 
000 inhabitants.
5 According to the same source in the 1970-1975 period only 14 countries were characterized by 
a fertility rate at or below 2.1. All of them, but Macau were in Europe.
6 The reason of term “probable” will become clear in the last part of the paper..
7 In 2008 the Population Division has produced eight different demigraphic scenarios: ﬁ  ve differ 
only with respect to fertility trends (low, medium, high, constant, instant-replacement fertility). 
The other three are based on the medium variant scenario: the “constant mortality” variant differs 
with regard to the path followed by future mortality, the “no change” variant differs with respect 
to both fertility and mortality, the “zero migration” variant only with regard to the path followed 
by future international migration; (Population Divisionn, 2009). 
8 In the case of countries with fertility above replacement, if fertility falls to 1.85 children per 
woman before 2050, it is then held constant until 2050. For countries with fertility below 1.85 
children per woman in 2005-2010, it is assumed that after a transitional period of 5-10 years in 
which it will follow recent trends, fertility will increase at a rate of 0.01 children per woman per 
year; (Population Division, 2009).
9 The decline of fertility below replacement level was clearly written in the long-term tendencies 
of this variable and the failure of demographers to forecast this Copernican change is to be 
imputed only to ideological reasons, i.e. the deeply rooted conviction that equilibrium would 
represent the end point of the demographic “transition”.octubre/diciembre 2009









1Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
14
Over a horizon of 15-20 years, the forecast of a closed WAP —a variable 
that will play a major role in the following analysis— is even more reliable 
since entries are constituted by generations of young people already born 
or that will be born in the following ﬁ  ve years. 
As  acknowledged  also  by  the  Population  Division,10  the  weakest 
assumptions  are  those  relative  to  migration.  The  Population  Division 
projection  of  the  migration  balance  of  each  country  is  based  on  two 
elements: past trends and the country policy stance on this issue, the ﬁ  rst 
being largely predominant. This approach is therefore based on the implicit 
hypothesis that the migration balance is totally independent from the 
natural balance of WAP and is not in luenced by the economic sphere, 
and more speci ically by labor market trends. 
The past performance of this approach has been, to say the least, rather 
poor. In the ‘80s, it has led to assume migration balances extremely lower 
that those that have then be registered. Lately, the progressive increase in 
migration balances has determined a parallel increase in their forecasted 
levels. The ﬁ  nal result has been that the initial scenarios of dramatic drops in 
total population and WAP have become progressively less pessimistic.11 
The decline of working age population and migrations 
ﬂ  ows in apdd’s countries
After  progressively  reducing  the  number  of  children,  a  decline  in  the 
number of births will provoke a progressive decline in the number of 
people in working age and therefore of the potential labor force. This 
phenomenon started in numerous developed countries toward the end of 
the XX century, but its full impact will become extremely more relevant in 
the XXI century. Table 1 reports the demographic projections made by the 
Population Division for 41 countries that will register a natural decline of 
their WAP between 2005 and 2050, together with the data for 1960-2005 
period.12 
10 See note 4.
11 What  has  happened  in  Italy  provides  a  very  good  example  of  the  consequences  of  this 
methodological approach. The ﬁ  rst population projections made in 1984 by IRP (Institute of 
Population Research) assumed a zero migration balance. The same assumption was made in the 
projection proposed by IRP in 1988. In 1994, a long term projection exercise proposed by the 
Director of IRP, on the line of a similar exercise made by Coale for the United States (A.J. Coale, 
1986:. 203 216) assumed constant values of 50 000 and 80 000 over a 100 year horizon. In the 
2001 in the projections published by the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) the migration balance 
was raised to 125 000 a value that has been brought to 200 000 in the last update published in 
June 2008. The last two projections cover the period up to 2050. In conclusion, in 24 years the 
Italian demographers have moved from a position that excluded that Italy would have received 
immigrants to forecasting the presence in the country of 11 million people born abroad in 2050.
12 Population Division, 2009. octubre/diciembre 2009
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In  1960  the WAP  of  the  countries  in  the  sample  amounted  to  594 
million that, at the time, represented 34 per cent of the world total WAP. In 
the following 45 years all these countries, but Germany and Luxembourg, 
registered positive natural balances that amounted to a grand total of 185 
million. Although 18 countries registered a negative migration balance, 
WAP grew in all the countries of the sample reaching a total value of 
859 million in 2005 (20.5 per cent of the world WAP). Immigrants from 
countries outside the sample contributed for 29 per cent, on the average 1.7 
million immigrants per year. Other 10 million immigrants moved between 
the countries of the sample so that net immigration in the 23 countries of 
arrival amounted to 85 million contributing to the growth of their WAP 
by 40.1 per cent. The ranking of arrival countries for total number of 
immigrants is lead by the USA (41 million), followed by Germany (10 
million), Canada, France (between 6 to 7 million), Russia and Australia 
(between 5 to 6 million). In Germany and Luxembourg, the only two 
countries with negative natural balances, migration was above replacement 
level. 
According to the Population Division forecast, in the ﬁ  rst half of this 
century, the dynamic of the WAP of the 41 countries of our sample will 
witness a Copernican demographic revolution: their natural balances will 
turn negative, determining an overall decline of WAP of 197 million. The 
phenomenon will reach maximum values in Japan and Italy (respectively 
-41.4 and -40.5 per cent), while the USA will be the less affected (-0.8 per 
cent) (graph. 1). 
What about migration? According to the Population Division forecast, 
three different situations will emerge. In a ﬁ  rst group of countries, net 
migration will be positive, but below replacement; in a second group, 
migration will more than offset the natural decline; in a third group, net 
migration will be negative contributing to the decline in WAP. 
In  the  ﬁ  rst  group  of  countries,  around  38  million  immigrants  will 
compensate 26.6 per cent of the natural decline of WAP (-143 million) so 
that the total balance will be equal to -105 million. In the second group of 
countries, 72.6 million immigrants abundantly offset a natural decline of 
13.6 million. WAP is, therefore, forecasted to increase by 59 million (+20.3 
per cent). Finally, in the third group of countries, a negative Migration 
balance of 3 million is compounded to a natural balance of -43 million to 
produce a total decline of 46 million (graph. 2). octubre/diciembre 2009
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The ﬁ  rst group of countries accounts for 71.7 per cent of the natural 
decline and for 35.4 per cent of the migration balance; the second group 
for 6.8 per cent of the natural balance, and for 67.4 per cent of the total 
inﬂ  ow of immigrants; ﬁ  nally, the third group of countries accounts for 21.4 
per cent of the natural decline in WAP, but will export labor to the other 
countries (graph. 3). 
These surprising results are due to the fact that the future values of the 
migration balances are obtained extrapolating recent values and, therefore, 
without taking in to consideration the huge change in demographic trends 
that  will  take  place  in  the  period  considered  and  the  interrelationship 
between the demographic and the economic spheres. The end result of this 
approach, as shown by the following scatter diagram, is that no correlation 
exists between the forecasted values of the natural balance and of the 
migration balance. 
For the moment the assumption of independence of the demographic 
trends from the economic sphere has not been questioned by economists, 
and  the  demographic  projections  proposed  by  the  Population  Division 
and by other Statistical Institutes, adopting the same methodology, have 
represented the starting point to intervene or plan interventions on the 
welfare system and to forecast labor market variables. 
For instance, in a study of the European Union (Carone, 2005), labor 
force is projected to 2050 multiplying an estimate of WAP, obtained with 
a methodology similar to that of the Population Division, by the rates 
of participation obtained trough an extrapolation procedure. The rate of 
unemployment, derived from political assumptions,13 allows computing 
the  level  of  unemployment.  The  difference  between  labor  force  and 
unemployment gives the level of employment. The end result of this, to 
say the least, anomalous procedure is that in EU25 countries employment 
is forecasted to decline from the maximum reached in the interval between 
2003 and 2050 by more than 31 million, 24 million in EU15 and 7 million 
in EU10. 
Also ILO forecasts labor force multiplying its projections of participation 
rates by the population estimates of the Population Division.14 
13 The hypothesis is that the unemployment rates will converge in all countries to the Nairu 
values estimated by the European Commission, DG-ECFIN for the year 2008. 
14 ILO provides estimates of the labor force for the period 2007-2020 covering 191 countries and 
territories. The data are available at the ILO main website on labour statistics (http://laborsta.
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The implication of these statistical procedures is that fertility not only 
represents the prime engine of demographic trends, but also a limiting 
factor of economic growth, determining the upper limit of the employment 
level and, implicitly, enterprise localization. 
A simple model to explain net migration ﬂ  ows
The only way to avoid a mechanical approach to forecasting migration and 
its unrealistic consequences15 is to use a model. Demographic theory does 
not have formalized migration models, while economists have models that 
explain departures, but not arrivals. In substance, at the moment, we do not 
have theoretical tools allowing: 
To identify which countries are or will become countries of departure  • 
and which countries are or will become countries of arrival.
To  explain,  and  therefore  forecast,  the  level  of  net  migration  in  • 
destination countries. 
The  model  we  propose16,  while  identifying  countries  of  potential 
departure and country of potential arrival, aims to provide an explanation 
of  migration  balances  and  therefore  a  theoretical  basis  to  forecasts 
immigration ﬂ  ows. The model is based on the following deﬁ  nitions and 
assumptions. We will say that a country presents.
A Structural lack of labor supply, •   when is characterized by a long-
lasting and relevant negative difference between generational entries17 
into the labor force and generational entries in to employment. 
A Migratory potential, when such long lasting and relevant difference  • 
is positive. 
The basic hypothesis is that the countries characterized by a structural 
lack of labor supply are countries of potential arrival, while the countries 
characterized by migratory potential are countries of potential departure. 
A structural lack of labour supply explicit itself in the fact that, in a 
given interval, a share of the jobs available in the country, that we deﬁ  ne as 
15 A parallel in weather forecasting would be to predict that tomorrow will rain because yesterday 
it was raining, in the moment of transition from the rainy season to the dry season.
16 For a full description of the model see M. Bruni, 2008 and 2009. 
17  Generational  entries  are  ﬁ  rst  time  entries;  generational  entries  in  to  the  labour  force  do 
therefore originate from the non labour force and are represented mainly by passages from the 
training phase of life to the labour market; generational entries in to employment come from the 
population of ﬁ  rst job seekers.octubre/diciembre 2009
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the Total Manpower Needs (TMN), cannot be covered by the local labour 
supply. The model assumes that the Migration Balance (MB) is determined 
by the Total Manpower Needs. In symbols: 
 
1] MB = f (TMN)
 
Total Manpower Needs are given by the difference between the increase 
in the level of Employment (∆E) and the change in the level of the local 
labor supply (∆LLS) taking place in a given interval: 
2] TMN = ∆J   ∆LLS
In its turn, the absolute change in local labor supply is the sum of two 
components. The ﬁ  rst, of demographic origin, is given by the product 
between the Natural Balance of WAP (NBWAP) and the rate of employment 
at time t (roet). The level and the sign of this variable are determined by the 
trend of WAP in the period considered. The second is determined by the 
change in participation behavior taking place during the interval. Therefore, 
it can be computed as the product of the absolute change in the employment 
rate18 and the level of the local WAP at the end of the interval: 
3] ∆LLS = (roet* NBWAP) +(roet+1 – roet) * (WAPt + NBWAP)
In order to test the model, we have computed the MB and the TMN 
for 29 countries, characterized by positive migration balances during the 
2000 2005 period. The sample includes Australia, Canada, the USA, the 
15 EU countries, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, Norway, Russia, Belarus and Japan. 
In 2000 the WAP of these 29 countries amounted to 691 million. In the 
following ﬁ  ve years twelve countries registered positive natural balances 
(+8.4 million) and sixteen negative natural balances ( 7 million), producing 
an  overall  slightly  positive  natural  balance  of  1.4  million.  During  the 
same interval, the employment level of the same countries has increased 
by around 19 million, and the total contribution of the local labor supply 
has been of around 7.2 million. The interaction between the growth in the 
number of jobs and the response of the local labor supply has resulted in 
18 For simplicity, we assume that changes in participation of the local labour force will translate 
immediately in an analogous change in the rate of employment. This assumption is justiﬁ  ed by 
the fact that, in general, we can expect that a situation of structural lack of labour supply will be 
characterized by a situation of frictional unemployment. Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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Total Manpower Needs of around 11.7 million. As a response, the countries 
in our sample have imported 17.3 million immigrants.
We have ﬁ  rst tested a linear model with the regression constant. 
MB = α+ ß TMN
The intercept aims to verify the presence of immigration for TMN=0 
and,  therefore,  of  an  immigration  component  not  pulled  by  demand, 
but pushed by the presence of a migratory potential or, more simply, by 
poverty. The regression analysis has shown the constant to be very small 
and statistically not signiﬁ  cant. 
MB = 18.5 + 1.448 TMN  R2 = 0.996
   (1.21) (82.48)
We  have,  therefore,  run  the  regression  without  constant  with  the 
following result: 
MB = 1.458 TMN    R2 = 0.996
  (92.76)
As expected ß, that measures the reactivity of foreign migration potential 
to the structural lack of local labor supply, is greater than 1 since immigrants 
workers take with them or are followed by some family members. It must 
also be underlined that the reciprocal of ß (in our case 0.683 per cent) 
provides an estimate of the employment rate of the immigrant population 
and, therefore, of the impact of immigration on the total employment rate. octubre/diciembre 2009
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Forecasting models and scenarios 
The model 
Demographic projections are based on the hypothesis that the three main 
variables that determine population trends (births, deaths and migrations) 
can  be  forecasted  independently  from  each  other  and  independently 
from the economic sphere and, therefore, from the dynamic of the labor 
market.
The  logical  system  I  propose  is  based  on  a  different  perspective. 
Fertility and mortality rates determine the trend of WAP. In the medium 
run (20-25 years) the upper limit of the local labor supply depends on 
past demographic trends, labor demand and social customs. The model 
postulates, in fact, that all capable men will end up participating in the 
labor market since for them to work is not a choice, but a social right and Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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duty, while women participation is determined by the level and trends of 
the employment rate, by social customs and the availability of services for 
children and elderly (Bruni 2008 and 2009). The growth in production and 
productivity, and therefore in employment, are determined by aggregate 
demand. In the medium run population size does not have a relevant impact 
on the rate of economic growth that depends on aggregate spending and 
not on population size. The presence of a structural lack or of a structural 
excess of labor supply is, therefore, the result of the interaction between 
population long-run trends and economic trends, between the demographic 
sphere and the economic sphere, given the laws, the social customs and the 
organizational structure that characterize the local labour market. 
Figure 2 provides a general outline of this alternative forecasting system, 
while Figure 3 presents a more detailed description of the computational 
procedure.19 
The model is articulated into two parallel paths: the ﬁ  rst relates to the 
demographic side, the second to the labor market side. The two paths will 
then converge to produce demographic scenarios. In its complete form 
the procedure is based on a stock-ﬂ  ow model of the labor market that 
allows estimating demographic and labor market variables by sex and age 
groups. 
The demographic side of the model provides a forecast of the closed 
WAP based on generational entries and exits. Generational entries are equal 
to the number of young people reaching the lower limit of working-age. 
Exits are determined by deaths in working age and by generational exits, 
i.e. by the exits due to the people who reach the upper limit of working 
age.20 
On the labor market side, the employment data by sex and age group 
allow estimating generational exits that are then summed to additional 
demand (the increase in the number of jobs) to compute the labor demand 
in terms of ﬂ  ow, i.e. total ﬁ  rst time entries in to employment. The increase 
in the number of jobs represents the main scenario variable and its values 
are established in such a way as to cover a realistic range. 
Labor demand in terms of ﬂ  ows and entries in the closed WAP allow 
estimating Total Manpower Needs in alternative scenarios of employment 
growth and labor market participation (the second scenario variable). 
19 The model has already been applied to Italy; see M. Bruni (2008) and to Moldova M. Bruni 
(2009).
20 If the time horizon is ﬁ  fteen years long, the only parameters needed for the ﬁ  rst step of the 
exercise are mortality rates, since all the young people who will become ﬁ  fteen during the period 
are already born.octubre/diciembre 2009
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FIGURE 1
Projection of the closed 
population
Assumptions on the rate of growth 
of employment
Population scenarios 
by sex and age group
Scenarios of the migratory 
potential and of the 
migration balance 
by sex and age group
Employment by sex and 
age group at time t
FIGURE 2
Population by sex and 5 
years age groups at time t
Projection of WAP with 
no migrations
Demographic scenarios
Scenarios of migratory potential 
(or lack of local labor supply) 
and of the migration balance
Scenarios of ﬂ  ow supply
Employment by sex and 5 
years age groups at time t
Replacement demand
Scenarios of ﬂ  ow demand
Scenarios of additional 
demand
Fertility rates
Mortality ratesPapeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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The following step consists in estimating the employment level, the 
migration balance and the working age population by sex and age group. 
These  data  can  then  be  used  to  compute  the  labor  market  indicators 
characterizing each scenario and compare the impact of alternative rates of 
employment growth and participation rates. Finally, the model can be used 
to simulate the impact of alternative demographic and labor market policies 
deﬁ  ned in a large perspective and inclusive of the policies affecting the 
educational and vocational training system, on one side, and retirement, 
on the other. 
A by-product of the data on WAP is the level and structure of women 
in fertile age by nationality. Assumptions on the speciﬁ  c fertility rates by 
age group and nationality allow computing the number of births. On the 
other side of the age ladder, exits from WAP and mortality rates allows 
computing the number of elderly by sex and age group. All necessary 
information is then available to compute total population by sex, age group 
and  nationality  in  various  scenarios  of  employment  growth  and  labor 
market participation. 
In  conclusion,  the  model  adopts  demographic  tools  (a  generational 
approach  to  the  construction  of  labor  market  variables  deﬁ  ned  as 
populations) and economic relationships to jointly produce labor market 
and demographic scenarios. 
A simpliﬁ  ed forecasting procedure 
This full-ﬂ  edged model allows forecasting population and labor market 
variables by sex and age group. It cannot be a goal of this paper to produce 
such  scenarios  for  all  the  countries  that  are  going  to  be  interested  by 
declining natural balances of WAP in the ﬁ  rst half of this century, a task 
that requires statistical information and computational resources available 
only to National and International Statistical Institutes. 
The more limited, but still ambitious goals of this paper are: 
To identify a simpliﬁ  ed version of the model proposed in the previous  • 
paragraph allowing to derive a series of relevant analytical conclusions 
and policy recommendations. 
To apply this simpliﬁ  ed procedure to a limited number of areas and  • 
countries.
To compare the future trends in migration and population forecasted  • 
by our model with those published by the Population Division.octubre/diciembre 2009
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To  analyze  their  different  economic  and  social  implication  using  • 
economic indicators of structural burden. 
To  derive  some  general  conclusions  on  such  topics  as  the  future  • 
demographic  trends  of  below  replacement  fertility  countries,  the 
relationship  between  employment  growth,  migration  and  structural 
burden, and the inversion of the sign of migration balances in transition 
countries.
To discuss the policy implications of the different vision of the future  • 
demographic trends produced by the model.
To analyze the interrelationship between the theory of demographic  • 
transition and immigration and the possible role of immigration in 
bringing fertility back to replacement level. 
According  to  the  model  previously  proposed,  net  immigration  is 
determined by the Total Manpower Needs (TMN) generated by the trend 
in local working age population and by the rate of growth of employment, 
while increases in the participation rate can partially offsets the lack of 
local labor supply. Therefore, given the natural trend in WAP, the Migration 
Balance (MB) is a function of the rate of employment growth (x) and of the 
absolute variation in the participation rate (z). 
In a scenario perspective, the TMN can be computed as the algebraic 
sum of three components: 
The Demographic Manpower Needs (DMN) generated by the Natural 
Balance of WAP (NB); this component is equal to the product of the 
forecasted natural balance and the employment rate at time t; it measures the 
number of jobs that can or cannot be covered by the local WAP, assuming 
the rate of employment constant 
4] DMN = NB * roet 
The  Manpower  Needs  determined  by  the  increase  in  Employment 
(EMN); we can express this variable as the product between the employment 
level at time t (Et) and its rate of growth over the time interval chosen for 
the scenario (x): 
5] EMN = Et * xj
The  contribution  of  local  labor  force  to  cover  employment  needs 
through an increase in its rate of participation (PC); it can be expressed as Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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the product between local WAP21 at time t+1 and the absolute change in the 
rate of participation (z)
6] PC = (WAPt+ NB) * z
Therefore 
7] MB =  β [NB * roet + Et * xj   (WAPt + NB) * z)]
Since  in  any  given  interval  and  for  any  given  country,  the  natural 
balance is known and the roe is a datum of the problem, the migration 
balance determined by DMN is a constant (A).
A = β NB roet
Therefore 
8] MB = A * β [Et *x j   (WAPt + NB) * z)]
This  formulation  shows  that  the  Total  Manpower  Needs  have  a 
demographic component and a labor market component. The demographic 
component is determined by the change in WAP, while the labor market 
component is a direct function of the rate of growth of employment and 
an inverse function of the increase in the rate of participation of the local 
population in working age.
The forecasting exercise
In order to capture the implications of the forecasting model we have just 
proposed, we have build scenarios for two countries, Japan and Russia, 
and for two large areas, the ﬁ  rst including Australia, Canada and USA (the 
New World Countries), the second the countries in EU15. The choice of 
Japan and Russia is justiﬁ  ed by their demographic and economic relevance 
and by the fact that they will be affected by a very pronounced decline of 
WAP. 
Tables 2 and 3 presents the demographic and labor market data for 
the 1985 2005 period and for the last ﬁ  ve years of this time interval for 
21Local labour force must be understood as the labour force present in the country at the beginning 
of the period.octubre/diciembre 2009
Demographic forecasts, migration and transition theory: a labor market.../M. BRUNI
33
the same22 countries.23 This allows setting a comparative background for 
the scenarios and choosing the parameters required by the model, paying 
attention not only to long term tendencies, but also to the most recent 
evolutions of the relevant variables. 
Between 1985 and 2005, the natural balance of WAP has been positive 
in NWC, EU14 and Japan, negative in Russia. The sharp decline in fertility 
affecting EU countries, Japan and Russia is reﬂ  ected by an increase of 
the natural balance yearly average in the last ﬁ  ve years of the interval 
considered. The NWC, where the number of births has notably increased 
since 1975, shows the opposite trend. 
Between 1985 and 2005, the rate of employment growth presents the 
maximum value in NWC (22 per cent); EU15 countries follow with 13 per 
cent. In Japan employment has increased by ﬁ  ve per cent. Russia, that went 
trough a transition phase from a command economy to a market-based 
economy, registers a long run negative rate of employment growth. In the 
last ﬁ  ve years, the rate of employment growth has been similar in NWC, 
EU 15 and Russia (around 5 per cent), while in Japan employment has 
declined by one per cent, as a consequence of the 2001 and 2002 economic 
crisis. 
The changes of the rate of employment are directly related to the rates 
of employment growth, the largest expansion being, however, registered by 
Japan. After a large drop registered at the beginning of the ’90s, Russia’s 
rate of employment has recovered and in 2005 it was higher than in EU15 
countries. 
As a result of these tendencies, between 1985 and 2005, the two areas 
have registered Total Manpower Needs respectively of 22 and 8.6 million 
that were paralleled by the net inﬂ  ow of 31 and 13 million immigrants (table 
4). Between 2000 and 2005 in NWS the yearly average migration balance 
has been similar to that of the longer interval, while in EU15 countries, 
whose natural balance has become negative, it registers a notable increase. 
Japan shows a trend similar to that of the EU15 countries with a negative 
value over the 20 years interval and a slightly positive value in the last 
ﬁ  ve years, notwithstanding the decline in employment growth and a small 
increase in the employment rate. Finally, Russia has registered relevant 
manpower needs in the long run that have been countered by more than 
six million immigrants; immigration has however slowed down in the last 
ﬁ  ve years. 
22 The retrospective data for the European Union refer to 14 countries since homogeneous data 
were not available for Germany. 
23  For  simplicity  of  exposition  from  now  on  we  will  refer  to  both  areas  and  countries  as 
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It must also be underlined that:
Between 1985 and 2005 the four countries taken together had an average  1. 
yearly migration balance of 2.5 million and immigrants accounted for 
69.1 per cent of the increase in WAP.
Between 2000 and 2005 the yearly migration balance has been equal to  2. 
3.4 million and has accounted for 93 per cent of WAP growth.
Migration has been above replacement level in all the cases in which  3. 
the natural balance has been negative, the only exception being Japan 
between  2000  and  2005.  However,  in  this  period  Japan  has  lost 
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The overall picture is coherent with the model proposed, net immigration 
inﬂ  ows responding to the changes in employment needs in all the four 
cases we have taken in to consideration. 
Equation [8] provides a simple formula for forecasting the level of 
immigration as a function of the rate of growth of employment and of 
the absolute change in the rate of employment. The table below reports 
the explicit form of equation [8] for each of the four countries we are 
considering.Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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The constant term represents the amount of migration required to keep 
both the employment level and the employment rate constant. NWC are the 
only case registering a positive natural balance in the 2005 2025 interval 
and, therefore, a negative value of the constant. 
On the basis of the previous equations we have computed ﬁ  ve scenarios. 
The ﬁ  rst 4 refer to two possible values of employment growth: 
Zero employment growth.  • 
A growth equal to the one registered during the 1985-2005 period. •  24
And two alternative changes in the rate of employment:
An increase equal to the one registered between 1985 and 2005.  • 
Zero increase. • 
We  have  also  built  an  intermediate  scenario  (Sc.  3)  assuming  an 
employment growth equal to half of that registered between 1985 and 2005 
and an increase in the employment rate of the local population equal to half 
of the value registered in the previous 20 years. The following prospect 
shows the values of the parameters used for each of the ﬁ  ve scenarios for 
the four countries. 
24 Given the large difference between the long and short-term values of x and z, the values for 
Russia have been taken equal to the average values of the four countries in the 20 year interval.
25 The data necessary to build the scenarios are:
1. WAP at time t. 
2. The natural balance of WAP between 2005 and 2025. 
3.The employment level at time t. 
 For homogeneity, demographic data have been taken or computed using the database of the 2008 
World Population Prospects; employment data have been taken from the database of ILO. The 
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The ﬁ  ve scenarios aim to provide a large range of Total Manpower 
Needs as function of employment growth and labor market participation. 
Scenario 1.1 depicts the situation that would prevail if the economic system 
would present periods of crisis and recovery bringing to an employment 
level equal to the initial one, while the participation of the local labor force 
increases to avoid immigration. It aims to provide the lowest possible 
migration  estimate.  In  Scenario  1.2  we  assume  the  same  employment 
situation, but in this case the local population does not ﬁ  nd any stimulus to 
increase its presence in the labor market. The manpower needs expressed 
by this scenario are equal to the Demographic Manpower Needs. 
Scenarios 2.1 and 2.2 differ from the previous ones with respect to the 
employment trend that reﬂ  ects what has happened in the previous twenty 
years. Scenario 2.1 is a trend scenario, and measures the total manpower 
needs in the case in which history would repeat itself, both for what relates 
to employment growth and change in the rate of employment. Scenario 2.2, 
in which local labour force participation is kept constant, aims to provide 
an estimate of the maximum possible value of immigration in the 20 year 
period of the scenarios. 
Finally Scenario 3, that assumes a rate of employment growth and 
an increase in the rate of employment both equal to half of the values 
registered in the previous 20 years, provides a conservative estimate of 
what could happen in the four our countries if the global economy would 
register moderate economic growth and labour market participation would 
continue to expand, although at a lower rate. 
Table 5 reports the values of the TMN for each scenario and country. 
The table also reports:
The Manpower Needs generated by the Natural balance (A). • 
The Manpower needs generated by the growth in employment (B).  • 
The manpower needs offset by the increase in local WAP participation  • 
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The range of theTotal Manpower Needs of the four countries is very 
large, expanding from a minimum of  8.7 million in SC. 1.1 and a maximum 
of 108.3 million in SC. 2.2. 
The NWC, on one side, and of Japan, on the other, represent the extreme 
cases. 
As we have already noted, between 2005 and 2025, the natural balance 
of the NWC is expected to be positive. This implies negative Demographic 
Manpower Needs equal to  1.2 million (Sc. 1.2). If the labour market 
participation of the local WAP would increase, the TMN would be equal to 
 10.2 million (Sc. 1.1). The NWC are also those that are assumed to present 
the highest rate of employment growth. As a consequence, the TMN are 
equal to 27.5 million in the trend scenario and reach a maximum of 36.4 
million in the case of constant labor market participation (SC. 2.2). 
At the other extreme we have Japan that is expected to present the highest 
percentage natural decline of WAP. Accordingly, Japan is characterized 
by  relatively  very  high  Manpower  Needs  of  Demographic  origin  (9.6 
million) and its Total Manpower Needs would remain positive even with 
an increased labor market participation (6.3 million). It must be underlined 
that Japan is the only country where SC. 1.1 presents a positive value. In 
the trend scenario, the TMN would be equal to 10.5 million and reach 13.9 
million if labor market participation of the local labour force would not 
increase. 
EU15 countries are characterized by the highest DMN (12.7 million), 
but also by the highest potential contribution of the local labor supply (17.3 
million). Therefore the TMN are negative in Scenario 1.1, but present 
the highest value in SC. 1.2 (12.7 million). The same large difference octubre/diciembre 2009
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characterizes the scenarios with employment growth (17.4 million SC. 2.1 
and 34.7 million SC. 2.2). 
The case of Russia is similar to that of EU 15, with a very high DMN 
and a very strong compensatory power of the local labor supply. 
Table 6 reports the migration balances implied by the TMN we have 
just commented. The intermediate scenario provides an interesting point of 
reference. In this scenario total net migration averages around 3.6 million 
per year, an amount in line with the 2000 2005 period. Given the increase 
in the rate of WAP decline that will characterize the 2005 2025 period 
and the conservative hypothesis on employment growth, the intermediate 
scenario does most probably indicate the minimum level of migration that 
we can expect in the interval we are considering. The values are obviously 
much higher in the scenarios with employment growth, both in the case 
of constant and increasing employment rate of the local WAP (around 8 




￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ !!"￿￿ ￿#$￿%￿
￿￿&￿￿&￿￿￿ ￿￿'&(￿ ￿￿&￿￿ (&￿￿ ￿￿&)￿ ￿￿￿&*￿
￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿ ￿￿&+￿ ￿+&￿￿ ￿'&￿￿ ￿￿&￿￿ '￿&(￿
￿￿&￿￿&￿￿￿ '￿&￿￿ ￿￿&'￿ ￿￿&)￿ ￿+&￿￿ ((&)￿
￿￿&￿￿&￿￿￿ ￿)&￿￿ ￿￿&￿￿ ￿￿&￿￿ )'&￿￿ ￿￿*&(￿
￿￿&￿)￿ ￿(&￿￿ ￿￿&￿￿ ￿'&*￿ ￿￿&+￿ *￿&￿￿
,#￿&￿-"."!"#￿￿/!$"0￿$/!￿￿ ￿*&￿￿ ￿*&￿￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿&￿￿ '￿&*￿
￿
In evaluating these data it should be reminded that in Japan the 15-64 
employment rate is already very close to the physiological level, while the 
margin of expansion in the other countries can be considered marginal, 
also in consideration of the fact that the employment rate of the 15-24 age 
group can not be expected to increase. In conclusion, these data suggest 
that, keeping everything else constant, the most probable average value of 
the total migration balance in the 2005-2025 interval will amount to six, 
seven million per year. Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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Table 7 reports the level of WAP in each scenario for the four countries. 
With the exception of the highly improbable case of constant employment 
and increased participation, WAP will increase. The increase will positively 
related to the rate of growth of employment and inversely related to the 
increase in local WAP presence in the labour market. 
The previous WAP data and the employment levels, derived from the 
hypotheses on the employment rate of growth, allow computing estimates 
of the rates of employment (table 8). The rates of employment are directly 
related to those of the local WAP and inversely related to the reactivity of 
the migration balance to the TMN (ß). 
As ﬁ  nal step of our procedure, we have computed for each country and 
scenario rough estimates of total population. In order to do so we have taken 
the estimates of the population 65 and older published by the Population 
Division. This choice is justiﬁ  ed by the fact that over a twenty years interval 
different migration levels will affect the number of the elderly is aggregate 
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For what relates to the 0 14 age group we have adjusted the Population 
Division forecast multiplying it by a proportionality factor obtained dividing 
the number of immigrants of the scenario by the number of immigrants 
forecasted by the Population Division.
As shown by table 9, total population increases in every country and in 
every scenario with some minor exceptions, Russia in scenarios 1.1 and 
1.2 and EU15 in scenario 1.1. 
In conclusion we can state that a consistent and prolonged decline of 
fertility below the replacement level will determine an increase in WAP 
and in Total population. 
A comparison with the forecast of the Population Division 
The results presented in the previous paragraph differ sharply from those 
of the Population Division.27 
In the ﬁ  rst place, according to the Population Division, the total migration 
balance of the four countries is expected to average only 2.3 million per 
year (a value lower than that registered between 2000 and 2005) and equal 
to less than half of the value we have suggested as the most probable, 
considering a realistic rate of employment growth and a limited increase in 
the participation of the local WAP (table 6). 
In the second place, 58.3 per cent of the total migration balance would 
be absorbed by NWC, while EU15 would account for 37.5 per cent, Russia 
and Japan for 2 per cent each. In our intermediate scenarios, EU15 countries 
are the most important port of arrival, while the immigration share of NWC 
is not expected to be much larger than those of Japan and Russia. The 
scenarios 2.1 and 2.2 provide different percentage distributions of the total 
migration balance, but the common element is a rather large role of Russia 
and Japan (graph. 5). 
These different forecasts of the migration balances end up producing 
very different demographic trends. According to the Population Division, 
in the next 20 years the total WAP of the four countries will remain basically 
constant (table 7) due to an increase of almost 29 million in the NWC and 
a similar decline in the other three countries (EU15 -1.9 million, Japan 
–11.9, Russia -14.4) (table 7). Total population is forecasted to expand 
26 This implies accepting the Population Division assumption about fertility. Since the fertility 
differential between local and foreign women is not taken into consideration by the Population 
Division, this procedure does almost certainly underestimate the future number of births. 
27 The comparison will be made with the medium variant projection; (Population Division, 
2009). octubre/diciembre 2009
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by 70 million (table 9). Also in this case the increase is largely due to 
the NWC, whose Population is expected to increase by 67 million (18.8 
per cent). Also the total population of the EU15 countries is forecasted 
to increase, although in a much more limited way (+19 million equal to 
ﬁ  ve per cent), while Japan and Russia will loose, respectively, two and 14 
million inhabitants (table 9). 
￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿










￿￿ ￿!"￿￿￿ "#￿￿$%￿￿#￿￿ ￿"￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿"￿￿￿ #￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿￿'￿ "#￿￿￿"("￿"#￿)￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"￿ ￿"$￿ "#￿&￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿
Finally  we  must  point  out  that,  according  to  our  interpretation  of 
migration ﬂ  ows, these forecasts, far from being neutral, imply well-deﬁ  ned 
future trends of the main labor market variables, extremely different from 
country to country. In the case of NWC, for instance, the migration balance 
proposed  by  the  Population  Division  corresponds  to  an  employment 
growth  of  11.1  per  cent  in  a  constant  employment  rate  scenario,  and 
to an employment growth if 5.8 per cent if we assume a growth of the 
employment rate in line with that registered in the previous 20 years. For 
EU15 countries the migration balance proposed by the Population Division 
corresponds to a 2.8 per cent growth in employment, assuming a rate of Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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employment constant, and to a growth of two percentage points of the 
employment rate assuming no growth of the employment level. Finally, in 
the case of Japan and Russia, the forecasted migration balance would cover 
only less than 10 per cent of the demographic manpower needs. 
Demographic and economic indicators 
of social burden
Demographic indicators
Between 1960 and 2005 the percentage of the elderly has more than doubled 
in all the countries we are considering. At the same time, the percentage 
of the young has strongly declined. According to the Population Division 
medium variant, between 2005 and 2050, the percentage of the young 
will  remain  substantially  constant,  while  the  percentage  of  the  elderly 
will continue to increase, although at a lower rate. These data take a very 
dramatic look when ﬁ  ltered through the standard indicators of structural 
burden. 
 The indicators normally used to measure the structural burden generated 
by ageing are strictly demographic in nature: the Potential Support Ratio 
(PSR) is obtained dividing the Working Age Population by the number of 
elderly; the Age Dependency Ratio (ADR) is the reciprocal of the PRS. 
Table 10 reports the total and speciﬁ  c values of the ADR, expressed for 
thousand people in WAP for four years: 1960, 2005, 2025 and 2050. 
Between 1960 and 2005, the value of the total ADR has declined in 
all four countries due to a decrease of the relative weight of the young 
more pronounced than the increase registered by the elderly. Therefore, 
according to this indicator, developed countries have registered a notable 
decline of the structural burden particularly pronounced in the NWC and 
in Russia. In 2005 the values are included between a minimum of 406 in 
Russia and a maximum of 509 in Japan. 
The situation presents a dramatic change in the following 45 years. 
All four countries register dramatic increases of the structural burden, 
particularly pronounced in Japan (from 509 to 963), in EU15 (from 508 to 
772) and in Russia (from 406 to 656), the NWC being the less affected (from 
492 to 576). As shown by graph 6, the increase of the ADR is determined 
mainly by the dynamic of the elderly and this explains why Japan, that will 
register the most pronounced ageing process due to a dramatic decline of 
its WAP, is expected to be the country most affected by the phenomenon. octubre/diciembre 2009
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The economic indicators 
The  employed  produce  the  income  that  sustains  themselves  and  the 
remaining population, while the WAP includes a percentage of people 
(students, retiree, housewife’s) that do not support, but are supported. It 
is, therefore, evident that purely demographic indicators can be totally 
misleading. 
The  choice  of  WAP  as  the  denominator  or  the  numerator  of  the 
demographic  indicator  of  structural  burden  reﬂ  ects  a  historical  phase 
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and WAP and in which information on employment levels were absent or 
were collected only every ten years by censuses. 
￿
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Therefore, while the use of demographic indicators can still be justiﬁ  ed 
in  countries  that  do  not  have  reliable  employment  data,  it  is  totally 
inappropriate when considering developed countries where:
Only one part of WAP, often less than 60%, has a formal job. • 
Estimates of the level, structure and tendencies of employment are  • 
available almost in real time.
The duration of the training phase of life has greatly increased and, on  • 
the average, the age of entry in the working phase of life is above 20.octubre/diciembre 2009
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Differences  in  education  laws,  economic  and  social  development,  • 
productive specialization and technologies cause different percentages 
of students, housewife’s and unemployed.
An  economic  indicator  of  structural  burden  that  does  not  have  the 
shortcomings indicated above and can therefore capture the socio economic 
characteristics of modern societies, can be computed substituting WAP 
with employment.28 Such an indicator allows:
To articulate the structural burden by the typology of the dependants:  • 
students, non labor force in working age, unemployed, and retirees.
To verify how much the changes in the structural burden are due, on  • 
one side, to demographic tendencies and, on the other, to the capacity 
(or lack of capacity) of the economic system to generate additional 
employment.
To estimate the growth of employment, and therefore of production,  • 
needed to obtain a given level of structural burden.
Table 11 reports the economic indicators for the four countries in 2005 
and in 2025 in the ﬁ  ve scenarios presented in the previous paragraph. In 
order to avoid the complex task of forecasting the number of students, 
we have chosen to use the data for the 0-14 age group. Therefore, a large 
portion of students is included in the inactive in working age. 
According to the economic indicators, in 2005 the relative situation 
of the for countries was radically different from the one depicted by the 
demographic  indicator.  Japan,  with  the  highest  employment  rate,  was 
the country with the lowest economic structural burden, 1000 Japanese 
workers having to sustain only 1005 dependent. EU15 countries presented 
the worst situation with 1301 dependents per one thousand workers. Russia 
and NWC occupy an intermediate position with 1,118 and 1,126 dependents 
per 1000 workers, respectively. 
Coming to the forecasts for the single countries, the intermediate scenario 
is sufﬁ  cient to better the economic indicator in EU15 and Russia. In EU15 
countries the increase in the number of the elderly is more than offset by 
the decline of the young and inactive in working age. In Russia a moderate 
28 A similar suggestion has been advanced by Tapinos who, however, does not underline the 
change in perspective and vast implications brought about by employing this indicator, (G. 
Tapinos, 2001). A recent paper of the Central European Forum for Migration Research has 
proposed to build indicators of structural burden using labour force as a measuring rod; this 
would however leave the unemployed between those who maintain, (J. Bijak, D. Kupiszewska, 
M. Kupiszewski, K. Saczuk, 2005). This indicator has also been used by OECD (OECD, 2004), 
and by the UE (Carone, 2005).Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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increase of the young and of the elderly is more than counterbalanced 
by a decline of the inactive. In both countries the trend scenario would 
bring to a strong decline in the total structural burden, while an increase 
in employment not accompanied by an increase in participation slightly 
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In NWC all scenarios determine a slight worsening of the 2005 situation, 
mainly as a consequence of a notable increase of the elderly. However in 
the trend scenario the worsening is marginal (16 points). 
In Japan the increase in the number of the elderly is really massive 
determining an increase in the structural burden of 115 points. However, octubre/diciembre 2009
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if the trend scenario would prevail in all countries, in 2025 the structural 
burden of Japan would remain slightly lower than that of Europe and NWC, 
while Russia would notably better its situation and become the country 
with the lowest structural burden. 
In conclusion the use of a correct indicator suggests that:
The dynamic of the structural burden must not be seen as a purely  • 
demographic  phenomenon,  but  also  and  mainly  as  an  economic 
problem.
The increase in the percentage of the elderly, and more generally of  • 
the dependants, can be offset by an analogous increase in the level of 
employment.
The increase in the structural burden can also be partially offset by  • 
an increase in the rate of employment that generates a decline in the 
percentage of the inactive in working age. 
The transition from departure to arrival country: 
a foreseeable phenomenon 
In the ﬁ  rst half of the 1970s Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece registered 
an inversion in the sign of the migration balance. This historical event 
came as a big surprise not only to the citizens and the politicians of these 
countries, but also to demographers and economists that had not foreseen 
the phenomenon. Since immigration started to take place in the presence 
of unemployment, the prevailing explanation offered at that time were 
based on ad hoc considerations and modiﬁ  cations of the immigration laws 
in arrival countries. With only a few exceptions this way of explaining 
migration ﬂ  ows has continued to prevail in the following years contributing 
to  produce  wrong  immigration  and  demographic  forecasts,  to  justify 
restrictive immigration policies and, as a ﬁ  nal result, to provoke illegal 
immigration. 
Using the model we have just presented we can argue that the inversion 
of the sign of the migration balances of the countries in the Northern shore 
of the Mediterranean was due, on one hand, to the exhaustion of their 
migration potential and, on the other hand, to the appearance of a lack of 
labour supply in occupations with low professional content and of a labor 
demand aimed to exploit cheap illegal foreign labour in agriculture and 
construction (Bruni, 2008). 
29 For the Italian case see Bonifazi C. and G. Gesano, 1994.Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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If we focus on the future, our model brings us to argue that numerous 
countries that have registered below replacement fertility for at least 15 
years and whose WAP will therefore decline at an increasing rate in the 
near future will witness an analogous phenomenon, sometime in the next 
25 35 years. 
Table 12 reports the demographic evolution of ﬁ  ve countries that are 
going to be interested by a massive natural decline of WAP and for which 
the Population Division forecasts a negative migration balance for the 
2005-2050 period. The overall decline of the WAP of these ﬁ  ve countries 
is expected to be of around one third, with a maximum of 44.2 per cent 
in Bulgaria and a minimum of a little less than 30 per cent in Korea and 
Cuba. At the same time, according to the Population Division forecast, 
these countries are expected to generate 1.5 million migrants. The right 
section of the table shows the labor market implications of such a decline 
in the following three alternative scenarios: 
S1 - Constant rate of employment.  • 
S2 - Constant level of employment. • 
S3  -10  per  cent  increase  in  employment  and  convergence  of  the  • 
employment rate to 70 per cent. 
In order to keep the rate of employment constant (S1), these countries 
would have to destroy a percentage of jobs equal to the percentage decline 
in WAP, for an overall total of almost 19 million (7.5 of which in Ukraine 
and 6.8 in Korea). It is evident that such a scenario implies a prolonged and 
devastating economic crisis. 
Alternatively, in order to keep the level of employment constant (S2), 
the rates of employment would have to increase above the physiological 
level. It must also be underlined that a constant employment level requires 
a growth in productivity equal to the growth in production, a result that 
no  developed  country  has  registered  in  the  last  60  years  and  appears 
unattainable in post industrial economies, characterized by the presence of 
a service sector weighting around 2/3 of total employment. 
Finally, a more realistic situation of moderate long run employment 
growth (10 per cent in 45 years) paralleled by the convergence of the 
employment rate to 70 per cent (S3), generate a positive migration balance 
of 31 million, 12 million of which in Ukraine and 12.7 million in Korea. octubre/diciembre 2009
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In conclusion, outside a scenario of catastrophic economic crisis, in 
the next 25 30 years, the sign of the migration balance of these countries 
will have to turn from negative to positive. The same conclusion applies 
to other transition countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Macedonia  and  Moldova  that  will  face  consistent  declines 
in WAP and for which the Population Division has forecasted negative 
migration balances. 
In the other transition countries affected by a pronounced WAP natural 
decline and for which the Population Division forecasts a zero or slightly 
positive migration balances, the third scenario shows that net immigration 
ﬂ  ows will necessarily be much more pronounced. 
In conclusion, according to our model, all European transition countries 
will start to register positive migration balances between 2025-30 and the 













Migration ﬂ  ows and demographic transition 
In  his  monumental  work  on  transition  theory,  Chesnais  observed  that 
migration  “is  silent  about  the  regulative  role  of  external  migrations” 
(Chesnais,  1986).  Chesnais  did,  however,  point  out  the  correspondence 
between the intercontinental migration ﬂ  ows of the XIX century and the peak 
in population growth in European countries. More recently, demographic 
analysis has, on the contrary, failed to take notice of the correspondence 
between the increase in migration ﬂ  ows that has taken place starting at 
the end of the ‘80s, and the ongoing decline in fertility below replacement 
level  affecting  numerous  industrialized  and  developing  countries. This octubre/diciembre 2009
Demographic forecasts, migration and transition theory: a labor market.../M. BRUNI
53
is not surprising since the observation of Chesnais was in line with the 
explanation  of  migrations  ﬂ  ows  from  the  supply  side,  privileged  by 
demographers, while a correct interpretation of the second event requires 
an interpretation of migration from the demand side, an interpretation that 
has never found much credit neither between demographers nor economists 
and even less between politicians. 
Historically, migration has represented a major topic of demographic 
analysis  and  demographers  are  still  the  leading  authority  in  the  ﬁ  eld. 
However, coherently with the mainly descriptive nature of their discipline, 
demographers  have  never  proposed  full-ﬂ  edged  migration  models, 
analyzing migration ﬂ  ows mainly from the supply side, great attention 
being given to the reasons determining departures and very little to the 
choice of the country of destination. Moreover, given the hypothesis of 
equilibrium underlining transition theory, the labor market consequences 
of a structural decline in WAP have been considered only very recently and 
generally cast aside with rather superﬁ  cial considerations. 
Economists have discovered migration only at the end of the ‘50s (Lewis, 
1954). The atomistic, hedonistic and rationalist nature of the neoclassical 
model (Ward, 1972), and more speciﬁ  cally of the human capital theory on 
which economic migrations models are based, has brought also economists 
to analyze mainly the supply side of the problem and to propose models 
that  deﬁ  ne  under  which  conditions  migration  outﬂ  ows  take  place  and 
which people are more affected by it. Moreover, economists have been 
prevented from considering the case of a structural lack of labor supply 
by  the  hypothesis,  underlying  the  neoclassical  labor  market  model, 
that the real wage equates labor demand and supply. It should also be 
reminded that economic theory, and more speciﬁ  cally growth theory, was 
developed in periods of demographic growth when the core problem was 
unemployment and the idea of a structural lack of labor supply was almost 
unconceivable. 
In conclusion, although for different reasons, both demographers and 
economists have never seriouly considered the possibility that a country 
could face a structural lack of labor supply due to the decline in fertility.
This  paper  has  suggested  that  the  decline  of  fertility  well  below 
replacement level for a prolonged period of time determines a structural 
lack of labor supply that will necessarily provoke immigration ﬂ  ows above 
replacement level. In a larger vision this approach suggests that the passage 
from a regime of high fertility to a regime of below replacement fertility 
provokes the passage from a situation of potential structural excess to a Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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situation of potential structural lack of labor supply. It therefore suggests 
that the fertility transition originates the necessary, although not sufﬁ  cient, 
conditions for sustained international migrations. 
In a ﬁ  rst phase of the demographic “transition” the decline in mortality, 
mainly children’s mortality, provokes a progressive increase in the number 
of people who enter the working phase of life. The resulting increase in 
the number of women in fertile age contributes, in its turn, to increase the 
number of births. In due time, as a consequence of these two subsequent 
phenomena, the natural balance of WAP acquire positive and increasing 
values and WAP enter a long phase of expansion, generally above the 
attainable  rate  of  employment  growth. Therefore,  the  normal  outcome 
of this phase of the demographic transition is the creation of a migratory 
potential of increasing size that represents the necessary precondition for 
migratory ﬂ  ows. 
During  the  XIX  century  and  up  to  the  Great  Depression  the  fast 
economic growth of Australia, North America and South America and 
the work possibilities they offered attracted the migratory potential that 
was accumulating in the countries that had ﬁ  rst entered the demographic 
transition and whose economic development had not been sufﬁ  cient to 
generate a rate of employment growth coherent with the growth in potential 
labor supply. This is the phenomenon noticed by Chesnais. 
As  a  consequence  of  the  decline  in  fertility  that  characterized  the 
period after the Great Depression, of the death toll paid in WW2 and of the 
economic boom of the ‘50s and ‘60s, also Belgium, France, Germany and 
Switzerland and later on Northern Italy started to present a structural lack of 
labor supply and joined the countries of the New World as areas of arrival, 
attracting mainly the migratory potential present in Southern European 
countries  and  Southern  Italy  where  a  still  large  and  underdeveloped 
agricultural sector provided a relevant reservoir of excess supply of labor. 
This  new  emigration  wave  progressively  exhausted  the  migratory 
potential  of  the  countries  in  the  Northern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean. 
Moreover, during the ‘70s and the beginning of the ‘80s the entries in 
WAP of the large cohorts born during the baby boom that characterized 
the second part of the ‘50s and the beginning of the ‘60s, together with the 
economic downturn determined by the oils crises, greatly reduced the need 
of foreign labor in many countries of arrival. The lack of models positing 
an interaction between the demographic sphere and the labor market, both 
in departure and arrival countries, prevented, as we have already seen, 
demographers to foresee the change in the sign of the migration balances octubre/diciembre 2009
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that took place in all South European countries in the ﬁ  rst half of the ‘70s. 
Later on, both economists and demographers attributed the phenomenon 
mainly to the introduction of the ﬁ  rst restrictive migration laws in Europe 
and in the United States. 
Starting at the end of the ‘80s, the accelerated decline in fertility that 
took place after 1965 began to affect the entries in to WAP in an increasing 
number  of  developed  countries.  The  great  articulation  of  occupations 
induced by technological innovation and the increase in the educational 
level of the generations entering the labor market provoked the appearance 
of a structural lack of labor supply for non qualiﬁ  ed jobs, even in a situation 
of relevant unemployment. This gave support to the prevailing and mainly 
ideological position that immigration was determined by the supply side, 
an interpretation that was supported by the lack of job opportunities and 
growing poverty that characterized developing countries. 
The  role  played  by  the  demographic  transition  in  creating  the 
simultaneous presence of situations of structural excess of labour supply 
and structural lack of labour demand in different areas of the world is 
illustrated by the evolution and forecast of WAP in developed, developing 
and underdeveloped countries over the 1950-2050 period. 
The world WAP will continue to increase up to 2050, but the yearly 
average increase is expected to progressively decline from a maximum yearly 
value of almost 70 million, reached between 2000 and 2005, to less than 
10 million between 2045-2050. This represents by itself an extraordinary 
change. While, at present, to keep the world employment rate constant 
total employment should increase by 1.8 per cent per year, between 2045 
and 2050 the same result could be reached with an employment growth of 
0.2 per cent. This could largely increase the probability to ﬁ  nd a job for 
the generations entering the working phase of life in that period, if the free 
circulation of the world WAP would be allowed.
The situation is, however, much more articulated. If we limit ourselves 
to consider the standard aggregation of countries according to the level 
of economic development, we observe that Developed countries are now 
entering a phase of declining WAP, Developing countries have reached 
the point of maximum increase (55 million per year), while in the least 
developed countries the natural balance will be characterized by increasing 
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Also this picture is too aggregate to fully capture reality since a large 
number  of  developing  countries  including  China,  India,  Bangladesh, 
Iran, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Turkey in Asia, Cuba, Brazil and 
Chile in Latin America, Algeria, Lybia, Morocco and Tunisia in Africa, 
are expected to enter the Area of Potential Demographic Decline before 
2050. According to the medium variant, in 2050 this area will include 98 
countries, totaling 2/3 of the world WAP. Between 2045 and 2050 in this 
area the total natural balance of WAP is expected to amount to around  14 
million per year, while the WAP of the remaining countries will increase at 
a yearly average rate of around 24 million. 
Therefore, these data strongly suggest that, before the second half of the 
century, the Total Manpower Needs of the countries with declining WAP 
will tend to correspond to the marginal structural excess of labour supply 
of the poorest countries. Moreover, we can expect that present arrival 
countries will progressively loose their relative weight, some departure 
countries will became arrival countries, while countries that at present do 
not produce migrants will become the new labour reservoir of the world. 
Table 14 report some very suggestive data. Between 2045 and 2050, 47 
per cent of the natural decline in WAP will be located in Asia, around 20 
per cent in Europe and around 11 per cent in America. 
China leads the ranking with a weight of almost 36 per cent (table 
15); Brazil and Russia are second and third and the three countries taken 
together account for more than 50 per cent of the total natural decline of 
WAP. Of the twenty two countries, whose absolute value of the yearly 
natural balance exceeds 100,000, only eight are in Europe; the United 
States rank seventh, immediately before Indonesia, but after Iran; Canada 
is at the 16th place preceded by Bangladesh and Turkey; the situation of 
France is similar to that of Algeria, while Myannar, the last of this group, 
precedes the UK.
From  a  long  term  perspective,  the  basic  point  is  that  the  different 
periods in which the decline in fertility has been taking place in different 
part of the world has determined, is determining and will determine the 
simultaneous presence of countries characterized by a structural lack of 
labour supply and of countries characterized by the presence of a structural 
excess oﬂ  abour supply, putting the necessary conditions for migrations 
ﬂ  ows of increasing size to take place. 
30 As we have already pointed out, the natural decline of WAP does not necessarily coincide 
with the appearance of foreign labour needs. Foreign labour needs can appear before the natural 
balance of WAP becomes negative if the exits from the training phase of life are not qualitatively 
coherent with the labor demand in terms of ﬂ  ows. On the contrary, in a situation in which such octubre/diciembre 2009
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At present, the negative natural balance registered by numerous European 
countries, and other developed countries is paralleled by the presence of 
a huge migratory potential in developing countries. In the second half of 
the century the structural lack of labor supply will spread, as we have just 
seen, in a growing number of developing countries, ﬁ  rst of all China, while 
a large excess of labor supply will be concentrated in a declining number 
of developing and underdeveloped countries. 
Some summary considerations 
The main thesis of the paper is that the positive and increasing migration 
balances that are affecting numerous developed countries are provoked by 
a structural lack of local labour supply, in the presence of an unlimited 
supply of labour in developing and underdeveloped countries. We have 
shown that both the structural lack of labour supply and the structural 
excess of labour supply are the consequence of the decline in fertility that 
coherence exists, they can appear after WAP has started to decline for natural reasons if the 
lack of labour supply in terms of ﬂ  ows can be offset by the presence of unemployed, by an 
increasing participation of the secondary labour force, by internal migrations. At the same time, 
the presence of even a very large migratory potential does not mechanically generate migrations 
ﬂ  ows. To migrate is a difﬁ  cult, risky and costly endeavor and consistent migration ﬂ  ows can 
take place only if a minimum level of economic and cultural development has been reached. 
According to United Nations data, between 2000 and 2005, less than half a million migrants did 
originate every year from the 30 poorest countries of the world, a value equal to only around 
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is affecting, although with different timing, almost all the countries of the 
planet.31 
A simple econometric test has provided strong evidence that migrations 
are, in fact, explained by demand, and that the migration balances of arrival 
countries tend to be in excess of their manpower needs since migrant 
workers move with or are followed by family members. 
31 It must be pointed out that situations of structural lack of labour supply and of structural excess 
of labour supply can also be generated by economic trends. Moldova provides a good example of 
a country where the economic collapse and the consequent dramatic decline in the employment 
level provoked by the transition from a command economy to a market based economy has 
generated a structural excess of labour supply; (M. Bruni, 2009). An example of structural lack 
of labour supply in the presence of positive natural growth of WAP is provided by the United 
States where between 1970 and 2005 employment grew by 75 million, while the natutral growth 
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The  utilization  of  a  new  forecasting  logical  frame,  specifying  the 
interrelationship between the demographic and economic spheres, has then 
allowed to jointly build demographic and labour market scenarios. A series 
of relevant conclusions have been derived from this exercise. 
The most important one is that the catastrophic decline in WAP forecasted 
by the main international and national institutions will not take place; on 
the contrary, the WAP of the countries characterized by below replacement 
fertility will increase. Since the size of the migration balance is directly 
related to the decline in WAP and to the increase in employment, the rate 
of growth of WAP will also depend on the rate of economic growth. The 
increase in WAP, together will the increase in the number of births brought 
about by migrations and the natural process of ageing, will then produce an 
increase in total population. 
In conclusion, the Area that at the beginning of the paper we have called 
the Area of the Potential Demographic Decline (APDD) can now be deﬁ  ned 
more correctly as the Area of Potential Demographic Growth (APDG).
The scenarios have also suggested that in the next 50 years the total 
number of people that will migrate for economic reasons will be at least 
around 250-300 million, a much higher ﬁ  gure than the around 100 million 
forecasted by the United Nations. Moreover, according to our model, in 
the next 20-30 years, numerous countries (including Eastern European 
transition  countries,  Korea  and  Cuba)  will  switch  from  the  group  of 
departure countries to the group of arrival countries. Finally, we have seen 
that, before the middle of the century, a large number of countries will 
enter the Area of Potential Demographic Growth. 
This obviously implies that the structure of migrations ﬂ  ows by origin 
and destination will also register numerous and relevant changes. The new 
pattern and its timing will depend not only on demographic trends, but also 
and mainly on the economic growth that will be registered by developed 
and developing countries. 
The  implicit  message  of  the  standard  demographic  projections  is 
that the future they present is inevitable, since it depends only on past 
trends and is not connected to the economic sphere. As we have already 
underlined, up to now politicians, and unfortunately also economists, have 
not questioned the realism of these projections and are using them to plan 
economic policies. 
The explicit message of this paper is that if it is true that the level and 
structure of a population are strongly inﬂ  uenced by past trends in fertility, Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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there is large space for migratory, social and economic policies aimed to 
shape the demographic structure of a country. 
Policies suggestions
The picture of the future demographic trends of our planet presented in 
this paper brings to the forefront new problems, while shedding a different 
light on others. Past experience shows that migration ﬂ  ows can offset the 
lack of local labour supply. However, migration ﬂ  ows alone will not be 
sufﬁ  cient to solve all the problems created by the decline in fertility. More 
speciﬁ  cally, we have to analyze, together with the appropriate migration 
policies necessary to correctly face the lack of local labour supply, the 
problems of structural burden and demographic unbalance. 
Structural lack of labor supply and immigration ﬂ  ows 
An  interpretation  of  migration  largely  based  on  the  supply  side  and 
accompanied by the fear of an invasion of foreign workers, together with 
the lack of instruments to estimate the need of foreign labour has brought 
arrival countries to approve and try to enforce yearly migration quotas far 
below the manpower needs of the labor market. However, manpower needs 
cannot be cancelled by law. These measures have, therefore, determined 
illegal  immigration,  followed  by  expensive  and  politically-difﬁ  cult  to 
promote procedures of legalization only once the market had clearly shown 
that in fact those illegal immigrant were already employed and needed by 
the productive system. 
This approach has obvious advantages for some economic actors. In 
the ﬁ  rst place, it allows the labour intensive sectors, like construction and 
agriculture, to exploit cheap labour. Moreover, as the present global crisis 
is  showing,  immigrants,  and  especially  illegal  immigrants,  represent  a 
buffer for local workers in period of recession. It also allows governments 
to take a conservative standing on the migration issue necessary not to 
loose the consent of large shares of the population ideologically adverse to 
immigration. However, it also has numerous drawbacks. In the countries 
of arrival it can reduce the incentive to technological innovations allowing 
companies to pay wages far below the market value. It implies the high 
cost of trying to prevent illegal entries and expel illegal immigrants, often 
needed by the labour market. It has, moreover, an extremely large human octubre/diciembre 2009
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cost represented by an unknown, but certainly extremely high numbers of 
deaths of young people and children trying to illegally cross the borders, 
the annihilation of small fortune accumulated by family and clans in order 
to allow a family member to open the road for a better life in a new country, 
the destruction of dreams and hopes. 
The  ﬁ  rst  action  that  the  countries  with  below  replacement  fertility 
should, therefore, undertake is to establish migration quotas coherent with 
the manpower needs of their labor markets. The methodology proposed in 
this paper represents a possible starting point to build more reﬁ  ned models 
capable to evaluate the level of net migration required by each country and 
its structure by educational level and occupations. 
The  problem  is  however  more  political  than  methodological  and 
technical. The solution we are suggesting requires understanding, on one 
hand, that the decline in fertility makes migrant workers indispensable to 
the functioning of the labour market and to economic growth, on the other, 
that many solutions proposed up to now can not solve the problem. More 
speciﬁ  cally, the structural character of the natural decline of WAP rules 
out the possibility that an increase in productivity or a larger participation 
of the secondary labour force could reduce or annul the need for foreign 
workers. 
The ﬁ  rst solution would imply an increase in productivity in excess of 
the increase in production equal to the decline in WAP. Taking the extreme 
case of Japan, in the next 40 years the growth in productivity would have 
to exceed the increase in production of around 41 per cent, a result totally 
out  of  reach  in  a  post  industrial  economy,  even  if  as  tachnologically 
advanced as Japan. The increase in the level of participation of women 
and older age groups, a solution proposed over and over by demographers 
and  International  organizations,32  could  represent  a  temporary  solution 
only for countries with low participation rates. Even in this case very 
simple computations can show that the need of foreign labour could be 
offset or reduced only for a few years and then migration would again 
become unavoidable. Moreover, in order to increase the participation of 
the secondary labor force, and especially of women, it would be necessary 
to implement programs extending the social services for children and for 
the elderly, programs that not all countries are willing or capable to adopt. 
Therefore, although increases in productivity and participation should 
be actively pursued, immigration represents the only long run possible 
32  This  was  the  main  policy  suggestion  contained  in  the  volumes  on  ageing  published  by 
OECD.Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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solution33 to the structural lack of labour supply, while the existence of an 
unlimited excess supply of labor in many developing and underdeveloped 
countries ensure that this solution will ﬁ  nd no bottlenecks in the international 
labor market. 
Structural burden 
The  implication  of  the  decline  in  fertility  that  has  more  attracted  the 
attention of economists and politicians is represented by ageing and by its 
consequences on the welfare systems. We have argued that the perception 
of the gravity of this problem has been enhanced and in certain cases totally 
distorted by the use of wrong indicators. 
The  choice  of  an  economic  indicator  “measuring”  the  structural 
burden in relation to employment has allowed showing that, contrary to 
the normal perception, the present values are included in an acceptable 
range. Moreover, the speciﬁ  c ADR values show that the most relevant 
contributions to the total structural burden do not come from the elderly, 
but from the students and the inactive. 
An intuitive implication of the economic indicator is that the structural 
burden is not generated only by demographic trends, but also by economic 
trends. In fact, according to this indicator, the structural burden increases 
only if the rate of growth of the dependant population is higher than the 
rate of increase of the employment level and this is obviously true also for 
the speciﬁ  c indicator associated to the elderly. Moreover, an increase in the 
employment rate has an indirect positive impact on the structural burden 
since it reduces the number of inactive. 
Given these general indications, we must however remember that the 
higher the rate of growth of employment, the higher the net inﬂ  ow of 
immigrants and larger their future impact on the number of elderly. This 
suggests that the dynamic of the structural burden should not be considered 
as a variable to be forecasted, but as a policy target to be deﬁ  ned together 
with the rate of employment growth, using forecasting models allowing to 
relate employment growth to immigration and immigration to the change 
in the population structure. 
33 This was the main thesis of the Population Division controversial report on replacement 
migration, a conclusion that I totally share. In my opinion the weak point of the report was 
represented by the choice of targets (keeping constant total population, keeping constant WAP 
keeping constant the PRS) that do not have any economic meaning (Bruni, 2008). octubre/diciembre 2009
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Inside this frame a relevant reduction in the structural burden due to the 
elderly can derive from a redeﬁ  nition of working age. The present deﬁ  nition 
of working age between 15 and 64 is already out of touch with reality and 
its use to analyze the structural burden in 2050 totally unrealistic. In all 
developed countries the average age of entry in the working phase of life is 
already above 20. At the same time, life expectancy is expected to notably 
increase. Although there is no scholarly agreement on the question whether 
human life does have a physiological upper limit, it would seem realistic 
to assume, on the basis of the most recent trends, that it will continue 
to increase in the next 50 years. My personal guess is that around 2050 
working age will be deﬁ  ned between 25 and 75. This does imply that at 
that moment the most relevant group of dependant will be represented not 
by the elderly, but by the young people in the training phase of life. 
The demographic disequilibrium
A  fertility  rate  below  replacement  level  does  necessarily  lead  to  the 
progressive decline of a closed population and eventually to its disappearance 
(Bourgeois-Pichat, 1988: 9-44). If the immigration model we have proposed 
is correct, the ultimate result of fertility decline will be totally different: the 
WAP and the total population will increase due to the inﬂ  ows of immigrants. 
The inevitable byproduct will be a progressive expansion of the population 
born abroad and the creation of a multiethnic society. 
This  event  has  been  evaluated  in  very  different  ways  by  different 
authors. Some have stressed the danger of a complete disappearance of 
the indigenous population and the consequent loss of the original identity 
(Coleman, 2002 and 2000). Others have argued that this process will also have 
positive effects since it will reduce cultural provincialism giving to the host 
country a cosmopolitan dimension and promote a healthy self-criticism. 
Moreover, with time immigrants, no matter what the ofﬁ  cial position of the 
host country regarding integration is, will end up identifying themselves 
with the country in which they live and with its history, inclusive of the 
enrichment  process  brought  about  by  migratory  ﬂ  ows.  It  has  also  be 
pointed out that in order to properly assess the effects of mass migration 
we have to consider not only the percentage of people born abroad, but also 
the cultural distance of the immigrants, the level of tolerance of the country 
due to its immigration history, the indifference to the problem generated 
by individualistic liberalism or by the concentration of immigrants only in 
a few areas of the country (McNicoll, 2000). On this respect, our analysis Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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has shown that the origin of the immigration ﬂ  ows will drastically change, 
probably in the direction of increasing cultural distance. 
It would seem, therefore, probable that even discounting for possible 
positive long-run effects, the social, cultural and political impact of mass 
migration will represent a serious issue that developed countries should start 
to consider immediately in order to devise and adopt suitable polices. 
To put this problem in a correct perspective we have also to consider 
the  probable  duration  of  mass  migration  for  the  countries  with  below 
replacement  fertility.  One  important  implication  of  our  model  is  that 
positive migration balances will continue to be needed not only as long 
as the natural balance of WAP will be negative, but as long as the natural 
balance will not be sufﬁ  cient to cover the manpower needs determined by 
the growth in employment. In other words, to avoid the social and political 
tension created by a structural need of foreign labour and at the same time 
allow for economic growth, the number of entries in to WAP has to become 
and remain higher than the number of exits, due to death and ageing, the 
size of the difference depending on the rate of employment growth. This 
seems to me the main long-run problem that the countries characterized by 
below replacement fertility will have to face. 
At present there is an almost total agreement between demographers 
that the TFR of developed countries will not substantially increase.34 This 
assumption does, however, discount, on one hand, the hypothesis that the 
fertility of migrant women does immediately converge to the fertility of 
the local women and, on the other, the fact that migration ﬂ  ows are largely 
underestimated by the standard model. 
If our approach is correct, the great majority of developed countries will 
be affected by migration ﬂ  ows much more relevant than those presently 
forecasted.  For  what  attain  to  the  assumption  of  fertility  convergence, 
it  is  interesting  to  remember  the  justiﬁ  cation  given  by  the  population 
Division: 
The projection methodology also assumes that, after immigrants arrive 
in a country, they experience the average fertility and mortality conditions 
of  that  country.  While  this  is  typically  not  the  case,  especially  when 
immigrants come from a country that differs greatly in a demographic sense 
from the receiving country, this assumptions permits computations to be 
more straightforward and also facilitates comparisons between countries 
(Population Division, 2000: 15).
34 This is clearly shown by the hypothesis on fertility on which the projection of the Population 
Division are based (see note 8).octubre/diciembre 2009
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In fact, as the growing literature on the subject has shown, the relationship 
between migration and fertility is a complex one. The prevailing idea is 
that migrants’ fertility will tend to converge to that of the local population. 
A series of alternative, although not conﬂ  icting, hypotheses, have been 
advanced to explain this process the most important ones being selectivity, 
adaptation, socialization and disruption.35 It has also be maintained that the 
fertility differential does not depend on the nationality, but on the different 
socio-economic composition of the two groups, i.e. on the fact that women 
migrants are in general less educated and qualiﬁ  ed than national women.
The different interpretations of the fertility pattern of migrant women 
imply different timing of the convergence, but the fact remains that for 
a certain period of time, possibly up to a generation, the contribution of 
immigrant women to the number of births does normally largely exceeds 
their demographic weight. Although comparative international data are 
lacking, the phenomenon is clearly signalled by many national statistics 
and local studies36 and it is evident that the contribution of foreign women 
to the level of the TFR, limited up to now because of the dimension of 
immigration ﬂ  ows, could become critical. An evaluation of this phenomenon 
is complex and largely exceeds the possibility of a single researcher since 
it involves for every country not only scenarios more sophisticated than the 
ones presented here, but also hypotheses on the structure of immigrants by 
nationality, sex and age, and on the fertility rates and patterns of the single 
ethnic groups. 
However, a possible outcome of our model, one that would seem to 
deserve  special  attention,  is  that  countries  characterized  by  a  strong 
demographic  decline  and  high  employment  growth  would  receive 
immigration  ﬂ  ows  large  enough  to  provide  a  substantial  contribution 
to reach the number of births necessary to annul the structural need of 
immigrants. 
In  conclusion,  a  possible  implication  of  our  analysis  is  that  the 
demographic transition could after all bring to a demographic regime of 
35 In the case of selectivity the convergence is explained by the psychological and demographic 
characteristics of the migrants. The adaptation model is centered on the physical, economic and 
social constraints of the new environment. The socialization model postulates that the decline in 
fertility is the result of a gradual process of acculturation at the end of which the migrants will 
adopt the local cultural models. This model does, therefore, postulates that the change will span 
over a long period of time and that it will be completed only with the second generation. The 
disruption model explains the decline in fertility on the basis of numerous factors that determine 
a perturbation in women reproductive behavior such as the temporary separation of the couple, 
the migration stress, and the socio-economic problems of the ﬁ  rst year in the new environment. 
36 In Italy, for example, in 2005 the total fertility rate of Italian women was 1.24 while the TFR 
of foreign women was 2.41.Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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equilibrium. However this would not derive from the impact of socio 
economic factors, but from immigration. 
A world labour market 
A major implication of the model presented in this paper is that this century 
will witness migration ﬂ  ows of unprecedented size made necessary and 
unavoidable by fertility decline and economic growth. In other words that 
the XXI century will be the Century of the Great Migration. 
It  will  be  up  to  the  governments  and  hopefully  to  International 
organizations to decide if such a process will take place inside a well-
planned and legal framework or illegally. It has been correctly argued that 
illegal migrations are the result of the functioning of the labour market 
and that the restrictive policies enacted by the governments of developed 
countries are expensive and useless efforts to try to prevent it (Harris, 2004 
and 2002). However, to imagine that the principle of free circulation of 
labour could be accepted today is unrealistic, but we can hope that the 
necessities and the logic of the market will end up imposing themselves 
and that the next generations will learn to live in a world characterized not 
only by the free circulation of products, but also of people. 
Conclusions
The arguments presented in this paper can be divided in to three main 
groups. 
The ﬁ  rst group includes statements that it will be easy to falsify or 
corroborate in not too far a future. This group includes the relationship 
between  net  migration  and  manpower  needs  and  the  related  question 
whether a decline in fertility below replacement will produce a decline 
or an increase in WAP and, therefore, in total population. It belongs to 
the same group of propositions also the rough estimate of the level of 
international migrations I have suggested, together with the indication that 
the number of arrival countries will progressively increase so that entire 
continents like Europe, and large parts of Asia, America and Oceania will 
become and continue to be for a number of years, at present impossible to 
forecast, areas of arrival. 
If my argument is correct, as I strongly believe, the procedures adopted 
to produce demographic forecasts should be changed along the line of the octubre/diciembre 2009
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logical system proposed here. The question is extremely relevant because 
the social, economic and demographic policies to be adopted in the two 
events are obviously very different, but both situations require structural 
and long run interventions. 
For what relates to international migration, if my estimates will prove 
to be correct, the problem of forecasting manpower needs, establishing 
coherent  quotas  and  deﬁ  ne  correct  migration  procedures  deserve  to 
become a relevant international issue to be confronted together by arrival 
and departures countries, on the basis of international scenarios that only 
Institutions  like  the  Population  Division  and  the  International  Labour 
Ofﬁ  ce could provide. This seems, at present, the most rational way to face 
the problem of illegal immigration and exploit the convergence of interests 
that the simultaneous lack and excess of labour supply will create, providing 
arrival countries with the labour force indispensable for their economic 
growth and departure countries with relevant amount of remittances that 
could play a key role in promoting development while emigration could 
notably reduce labour supply pressure.
 A second group of statements relates to issues that need to be confronted 
much more thoroughly both at the historical and local level and through the 
development of formal models. It has been shown that employment growth 
is the key factor to keep the structural burden under control, but also that 
employment growth generates net migrations above replacement level and 
will therefore contribute to notably increase the number of the elderly. 
At  the  same  time,  a  selective  mass  migration  policy  could  contribute 
to increase the number of births and therefore reduce, in due time, the 
unbalance between entries in to and exits from WAP, and therefore the 
manpower needs of demographic origin. This complex set of relationship 
should represent a relevant area of theoretical and empirical analysis greatly 
needed to connect development policies, migration policies, the reforms of 
the welfare system and the restructuring of the phases of life that will be 
imposed by the prolonging of the training phase and the lengthening of life 
expectancy. 
The third group of arguments involves the relationship between fertility 
decline and what I have suggested to be its by-product, the migration 
transition, in order to evaluate and eventually reformulate demographic 
transition  theory.  In  1982  Caldwell  remarked  “Classical  demographic 
transition theory assumed that replacement level was the end product of 
the transition ... Yet there is nothing in (my) analysis to suggest any reason 
why there should be such a ﬂ  oor to fertility decline... My best guess... is for Papeles de POBLACIÓN No. 62 CIEAP/UAEM
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declining population in all (Western) countries by the early 21st century... 
and in the world as a whole... by the end of that century (Caldweel, 1982). 
In  a  similar  vein  in  1997  Caldwell,  Jones  and  Douglas  (1997:  3) 
stated: 
... the convenient assumption that the end point of the demographic 
transition  can  be  marked  by  replacement level  fertility  has  now  been 
replaced by great uncertainty over whether there is indeed any endpoint. 
The  low  population  growth  rate  attained  at  low  levels  of  fertility  and 
mortality may represent not an endpoint, but rather a transition zone en 
route to massive population decline resulting from well below replacement 
fertility.
I am personally convinced that at present developed economies lack 
self regulating mechanisms capable of bringing the demographic system 
toward a situation characterized by similar values of births and deaths. 
In modern societies fertility is more and more the result of choices made 
by the couples in relations to their goals and values. Social and economic 
considerations  strongly  support  the  hypothesis  that  below replacement 
fertility  represents  the  most  obvious  and  reasonable  outcome  of  this 
situation. At the same time, life expectancy depends in a crucial way on 
scientiﬁ  c progress. In a moment in which genetic is at its beginning and 
the production and utilization of spare parts is becoming more and more 
relevant, to suppose that the growth in life expectancy we have witnessed 
in the XX century will decline appears unreasonable. 
The question we have raised is whether and in which measure mass 
migration  could  contribute  to  face  the  demographic  unbalance  of 
developed countries. Given the present estimates of future migration and 
the political overtones of the argument no analysis of this subject has yet 
been undertaken. It seems to me that such a topic should deserve more 
attention both at the national and international level. 
It is possible that in around 50 years the growth of the world WAP 
and therefore of the potential labour supply will be matched by global 
employment growth. However, according to our analysis, an increasing 
number of countries will need the excess labour generated by a progressively 
decreasing geographical area of the world. The ﬁ  nal question to which the 
future will have to answer whether this hard fact will be sufﬁ  cient to reverse 
the present trend toward more and more repressive migration policies, if 
the imperatives of the market will prevail over wrongly perceived national 
interests and their by-products, racism and exploitation of the immigrants. octubre/diciembre 2009
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